

## كلية القانون / جامعة القادسية

### القانون الدولي الخاص

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### 1.3 The bases of conflict of laws

What justification is there for applying a foreign law? Why not just apply the law of the forum to every case? Cheshire and North (*Private International Law*, 12th edn, p39) put it in the following terms:

There is no sacred principle that pervades all decisions but, when the circumstances indicate that the internal law of a foreign country will provide a solution more just, more convenient and more in accord with the expectations of the parties than the internal law of England, the English judge does not hesitate to give effect to the foreign rules.

Nevertheless, two main reasons for the application of a foreign law can be put forward.

#### 1.3.1

##### Justice

An underlying reason for applying a foreign law, rather than English

law, is

to serve the interests of the parties to the case and achieve justice. It would be unjust to treat parties, who entered into a contract unsupported by

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consideration in Italy, as if they had contracted under English law, and accordingly declare their contract void for lack of consideration (see *Re Bonacina* (1912)). It is clear that English courts apply Italian law in order to do justice between the parties.

### 1.3.2

#### Comity

Although the old theory that comity is the main foundation of the conflict of laws has faded away, its impact cannot be excluded altogether. Even today, references to comity are sometimes found in English judgments (see *Travers v Holley* (1953); and *Igra v Igra* (1951)). If, for example, first cousins domiciled in Portugal marry in England: suppose that such a marriage is valid by English law, but void by Portuguese law. The English court will hold this marriage void, even if the parties wished it to be valid. (This may be inferred from the Court of Appeal decision in *Sottomayor v De Barros* (1877).) Clearly, this decision does not serve the interests of the parties, but it is based on comity, partly to protect the interests of a foreign country and partly in the expectation that the

favour will be returned.

### 1.3.3

#### Public policy

Whatever the bases for the application of a foreign law are, the question is how far, if at all, should English public policy be relevant? In other words, will the English court enforce a contract for prostitution, albeit valid by its proper law? Will it enforce a contract for slavery, although valid in the *lex loci solutionis*? Scarman J observed in *In the Estate of Fuld (No 3)* (1968):

An English court will refuse to apply a law which outrages its sense of justice or decency. But, before it exercises such power, it must consider the relevant foreign law as a whole.

Hence, it is a general principle of the conflict of laws that a rule of foreign law, which would be applicable under the *lex causae* (that is, the governing law), may be disregarded if its application would be contrary to public policy. This doctrine is clearly necessary in the context of conflict of laws, but its boundaries cannot be easily defined.

Examination of the cases in which public policy was invoked to invalidate the enforcement of rights arising under foreign laws indicates that, in general, the doctrine has been applied in cases involving foreign contracts, and

those involving foreign status. These will be considered under their respective headings, and it suffices for the moment to illustrate its operation briefly. On the ground of public policy, the English court refused to enforce contracts in restraint of trade (*Rousillon v Rousillon* (1880)); contracts breaking the laws of a friendly country (*Regazzoni v Sethia* (1958)); an incapacity existing under a penal foreign law, such as the inability of persons divorced for adultery to

remarry, so long as the innocent spouse remains single (*Scott v AG* (1886)); the English courts also refused to recognise a marriage of a child under the age of puberty (implied in *Mohammed v Knott* (1969)).

#### 1.4 Classification or characterisation

In a conflict case, much depends on how the issue is classified or characterised. Is it an issue of breach of contract or the commission of a tort? This may be labelled as ‘classification of the cause of action’. Once this has been determined, the next stage is to ascertain the governing law which, as we have seen, depends on some connecting factors, such as the *lex situs*, the *lex loci delicti*, the *lex domicilii*, and so forth. These factors link the issue to a legal system. At this stage, a second type of classification has to be done in order to identify the legal characteristic of a particular rule. For instance, in English conflict of laws, capacity to marry is governed by the law of each party’s ante-nuptial domicile, and formal validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the country where the marriage is celebrated. Is the issue of parental consent classified as a rule of capacity or formal validity? This question may arise in a different scenario; for instance, a contract between an English employer and a French employee made and to be performed in France. The applicable law to the contract is French. In an action brought in the English court for breach of this contract, the English court will apply French law to issues of formal and essential validity so long as these rules are rules of substance and not procedure. The latter is subject to English law. However, problems may arise as to whether a particular rule is to be classified as a rule of substance or procedure. This type of classification may be labelled as ‘classification of a rule of law’. Each of these types will be considered separately.

##### 1.4.1 Classification of the cause of action

Every legal system arranges its rules under different categories which must form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim. These categories may be concerned with tort, contract, property, status, succession, etc. Before the English court can proceed to ascertain the *lex causae*, it has to determine the particular category into which the action falls. Does the action relate to the

formal validity of a marriage, intestate succession to movables, or some other category? Given the standard categories operating in English law, the difficulty arises when some cases do not fit easily into any single one of them. An action may fall under more than one category. For example, an employee may be able to sue his employer either in contract or tort; or the action may not fall under any of them, such as the duty of a father to provide a dowry for his daughter under Greek law (*Phrantzes v Argenti* (1960)). The crucial question, therefore, is how does the English court classify the cause of action? Is the classification made according to English internal law? It is obvious that the classification process

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is very crucial to the outcome of cases. However, case law does not show how this process is or should be conducted. According to Cheshire and North (*Private International Law*, 12th edn, p 45):

There can be little doubt that classification of the cause of action is in practice effected on the basis of the law of the forum...But, since the classification is required for a case containing a foreign element, it should not necessarily be identical with that which would be appropriate in a purely domestic case.

It follows, therefore, that an English judge must not rigidly confine himself to the concepts or categories found in English internal law.

It is worthy of note, however, that in the context of both the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 1968, and the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980, characterisation is unlikely to be referred to the legal system of any particular Contracting State, and is rather determined in a Community sense. Indeed, as shall be discussed in Chapter 3, whether a particular relationship amounts to a contract, or whether a specific act can be characterised as a tort, have been determined in a Community sense. For instance, in the case of *Jacob Handte GmbH v Traitements Mécano-Chimiques des Surfaces* (1992) an action brought by an ultimate manufacturer of defective



goods could not be classified as an action in contract for the purposes of jurisdiction under Art 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, despite the fact that it was regarded as such under French law, the law of the forum. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) expressed the view that a contractual relationship ‘is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another’.

#### 1.4.2 Classification of a rule of law

Once the legal category of a given case has been identified, the next stage is to apply the relevant choice of law rules in order to identify the *lex causae*. However, even at this stage, it may be necessary to classify a particular rule in order to determine whether it falls within one choice of law rule or another. This process can be better illustrated by examining two choice of law rules. For instance, capacity to marry is governed by the law of each party’s ante-nuptial domicile (that is, the dual-domicile rule), and the formal validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated. A problem of characterisation will arise if it is doubtful whether a certain rule of the domicile of one party is an issue of capacity, in which case the dual-domicile rule will apply, or whether it is an issue of formal validity, in which case it will not apply. A good illustration of this issue can be found in *Ogden v Ogden* (1908). A domiciled Englishwoman married, in England, a domiciled Frenchman aged 19. By French law, a man of that age needed his parents’ consent to marry and, without such

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consent, the marriage was voidable. In fact, the husband had not obtained such consent. How did the court classify this issue of consent? Was it an issue of formal validity and, therefore, the rule would not be applicable, or was it an issue of capacity, in which case it would apply? The Court of Appeal classified it as a rule of formal validity and, therefore, declined to apply the dual-domicile rule, for the marriage had been celebrated in England. In this case, the issue involved a classification of a foreign rule, but what if it relates to an English rule? *Leroux v*

Brown (1852) illustrates the process applied to an English rule. The case concerned an oral agreement made in France between a French employee and an English employer whereby the former was to work in France for a period longer than a year. This oral contract was governed by French law, under which the contract was formally and essentially valid. The employee brought an action in the English court to enforce the contract. The employer pleaded that the contract was unenforceable in England on the ground that the then English Statute of Frauds provided that no action shall lie upon a contract which was to last more than a year, unless the agreement was in writing.

If this provision were to be regarded as a rule of formal validity, then its application would be excluded, for the formal validity of the contract was governed by French law. However, the English court held it to be a rule of procedure and, therefore, it was applied as part of the *lex fori*. The justification given by the court was that the effect of the statute was only to prevent a party from bringing an action on a valid contract and not to make the contract void.